COPYRIGHT IN THE ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT AUTHOR: A
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH USING PHILIP BOBBITT’S MODALITIES
OF INTERPRETATION
Brian Golger*
INTRODUCTION
“It is often said that the greatest artists in the history of humanity are those who create
art in an era of scarcity. In an age of abundance, artificial intelligence has the
potential to be equally revolutionary in the world of art.”
—OpenAI, GPT-21

In October 2018, the sale of a portrait captured the imagination of art
critics and science fiction fans alike. The painting, Edmond de Belamy, from La
Famille de Belamy sold for $432,500 in an auction by Christie’s.2 The creator
of this painting was not a famous French impressionist but rather a French
art collective named Obvious—or more precisely, an algorithm created by
Obvious.3 The minds behind Obvious used a type of machine learning
algorithm, a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”),4 to enable artificial
*
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Articles Editor, Volume 22, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; J.D., 2020,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2015, Bowdoin College. I would like to give special
thanks to Professor Gideon Parchomovsky who inspired me to pursue this topic and provided
guidance on this Comment. I would also like to thank the Editors of Volume 22 for their excellent
work.
This quote was generated using OpenAI’s GPT-2 text generation system. The artificial intelligence
of GPT-2 was trained on a dataset of eight million web pages with the objective of predicting the
next word, given all of the previous words within some text. It is now capable of generating full
paragraphs of coherent language. For example, a user can feed GPT-2 a fake headline and it will
generate a story, or they can provide the first line of a poem and it will supply a whole verse. Alec
Radford et al., Better Language Models and Their Implications, OPENAI (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/; see also James Vincent, OpenAI Has Published the
Text-Generating AI It Said Was Too Dangerous to Share, VERGE (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/7/20953040/openai-text-generation-ai-gpt-2-full-modelrelease-1-5b-parameters. The quote used here was generated from the input: “Who is the author
of a piece of art generated by artificial intelligence?”
Gabe Cohn, AI Art at Christie’s Sells for $432,500, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2018/10/25/arts/design/ai-art-sold-christies.html.
Id.
See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets (Neural Info. Processing Sys. Conference Paper,
2014), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf; see also Thalles Silva, An Intuitive Introduction
to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), FREECODECAMP (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.freecodeca
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intelligence to create the painting.5 Whereas great artists of the past would
have honed their craft by practicing under the apprenticeship of master
artists, Obvious’s algorithm was fed with a data set of 15,000 portraits
painted between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries that it used to
“teach” itself what a portrait looks like.6 The end result was a masterpiece
that easily outsold the Warhol and Lichtenstein prints it hung across from,
prompting Christie’s to declare “the arrival of AI art on the world auction
stage.”7
In March 2019, Sotheby’s joined the fray, becoming the second major
auction house to auction off a piece of art generated by artificial intelligence.8
That work, entitled Memories of Passersby I, was created by Mario
Klingemann—a German artist and pioneer in the field of artificial
intelligence art—and sold for £40,000.9 Klingemann’s work consists of a
machine and two framed screens that work in real time to display portraits
of male and female faces onto the screens.10 Using a database of portraits
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the work uses GANs to
generate a portrait every few seconds.11 The result is an endless stream of
images, no two the same, that allows viewers to witness the artificial
intelligence at work.12
While the price the paintings fetched is remarkable, the reality is machine
authored works are nothing new. In the past few years, artificial intelligence
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mp.org/news/an-intuitive-introduction-to-generative-adversarial-networks-gans-7a2264a81394/
(explaining GANs consist of two different neural networks locked in a game, where the generator
tries to reproduce data from a training set and the discriminator acts as a judge to decide whether
the input comes from the generator or the true training set).
Cohn, supra note 2.
Is Artificial Intelligence Set to Become Art’s Next Medium?, CHRISTIE’S (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-mac
hine-9332-1.aspx.
Id.
James Vincent, A Never-Ending Stream of AI Art Goes Up for Auction, VERGE (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251267/ai-art-gans-mario-klingemann-auction-sotheby
s-technology.
Contemporary Art Day Auction, SOTHEBY’S (Mar. 6, 2019), http://www.sothebys.com/en/auc
tions/ecatalogue/2019/contemporary-art-day-auction-l19021/lot.109.html. While this price may
be disappointing in comparison to Obvious’s Edmond de Belamy, the sale does show a continuing
viability of artificial-intelligence art.
Naomi Rea, Sotheby’s Is Entering the AI Art Fray, Selling a Surreal Artwork by One of the Movement’s Pioneers
This Spring, ARTNET (Feb. 8, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/sothebys-artificialintelligence-1460332.
Vincent, supra note 8.
Id.
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has co-authored a short novel that almost won a literary prize,13 reported an
earthquake within three minutes of it occurring,14 and generated a video
game world featuring over eighteen quintillion planets.15 Recently, teenage
coder Robbie Barrat used artificial intelligence to generate a song in the style
of Kanye West by feeding the algorithm six thousand of the rapper’s lyrics.16
While originally only capable of rearranging existing lyrics, the algorithm is
now capable of writing its own songs entirely.17 There are many artists in
the budding field of artificial intelligence art who work with GANs and other
types of machine learning to develop breathtaking works of art.18 The
artificial intelligence movement’s use of open-source code allows many new
entrants19 and there is nothing to suggest this progress will slow down any
time soon, considering the projected growth of artificial intelligence.20
The buzz surrounding the artificial intelligence art “revolution” has been
shared by the legal world, as well. In the last five years, there have been a
number of law review articles grappling with the implications machine
authorship has on copyright law. So far, however, most of these articles have
focused on whether there should be copyright in works generated by artificial
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Chloe Olewitz, A Japanese AI Program Just Wrote a Short Novel, and It Almost Won a Literary Prize, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/japanese-ai-writes-novelpasses-first-round-nationanl-literary-prize/.
Will Oremus, The First News Report on the L.A. Earthquake Was Written by a Robot, SLATE (Mar. 17,
2014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/03/quakebot-los-angeles-times-robot-journalist-writes
-article-on-la-earthquake.html.
Simon Parkin, No Man’s Sky: The Game Where You Can Explore 18 Quintillion Planets, GUARDIAN (July
12, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/12/no-mans-sky-18quintillion-planets-hello-games.
ROBBIE BARRAT, NETWORKS WITH ATTITUDE (SoundCloud Mar. 1 2017), available at
https://soundcloud.com/robbiebarrat/networks-with-attitude; Dave Gershgorn, A West Virginia
Teen Taught Himself How to Build a Rapping AI Using Kayne West Lyrics, QUARTZ (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://qz.com/920091/a-west-virginia-teen-taught-himself-how-to-build-a-rapping-ai-using-kan
ye-west-lyrics/.
Id.
Naomi Rea, Has Artificial Intelligence Brought Us the Next Great Art Movement? Here are 9 Pioneering Artists
Who Are Exploring AI’s Creative Potential, ARTNET (Nov. 6, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/market/9artists-artificial-intelligence-1384207.
See Tom Simonite, We Made Our Own Artificial Intelligence Art, and So Can You, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/we-made-artificial-intelligence-art-so-can-you/ (detailing the
author’s efforts to create his own artificial intelligence art using existing code on GitHub).
See Artificial Intelligence Market Size is Projected to be Around US$ 191 Billion by 2024, MARKETWATCH
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/artificial-intelligence-market-size-isprojected-to-be-around-us-191-billion-by-2024-2018-08-08 (projecting the artificial intelligence
market to exceed $191 billion by 2024).
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intelligence21 or who should own the copyright in such works,22 the implicit
assumption being that copyright does in fact exist.23 These articles all
consider the question within the current framework of the Copyright Act
without seriously considering the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
Instead of framing the question as whether there should be copyright, an
inquiry into whether there constitutionally could be copyright in works
generated by artificial intelligence allows us to push on the basic premise that
the impressive outputs generated by these algorithms can qualify for legal
protection.
The Copyright Act draws its authority from the Constitution, and so any
analysis of the copyrightability of a work of art must begin with our founding
document. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (“IP Clause”), the Constitution
gives Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”24 The algorithms’
outputs are works of art that are oftentimes indistinguishable from human
works, so it may seem intuitive that a work by artificial intelligence can be
protected by copyright. If an algorithm’s painting is so similar to a human
work of art as to pass the Turing Test,25 why should it not be protected from
unauthorized copying?
Congress’s power under the IP Clause is not plenary. A proper reading
of the IP Clause shows that Congress’s authority is defined by five
boundaries, none of which Congress may overreach.26 One of these
21
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See, e.g., Raquel Acosta, Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Rights, HARV. J. L. & TECH. DIGEST (Feb.
17, 2012), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/artificial-intelligence-and-authorship-rights (“If
allowing AI developers to claim copyrights in their machine’s output incentivizes more creative
production, legislators should codify this copyright grant in the law.”); see also Bruce Boyden,
Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 379 (2016) (offering a test for whether a person should
be considered the author of a given work).
See, e.g., Robert Yu, Comment, The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection is Appropriate for
Fully Independent Computer-Generated Works? 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1257–60 (2017) (considering the
implications of finding the machine, programmer, or end-user as the author).
See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 5, 21 (2012) (assuming that the statutory definition could be amended to cover works where
there is no human author).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress acted swiftly in exercising this power, passing the first
Copyright Act in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Developed by Alan Turing in 1950, a computer passes the Turing Test when it convinces a
sufficient number of interrogators into believing that it is not a machine but rather is a human. The
Turing Test, STAN. ENCYCL. OF PHIL. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turingtest/.
Dotan Oliar, The Origins and Meaning of the Intellectual Property Clause 50–51 (Sept. 15, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/ip/oliar_ipclause.pdf. The five
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limitations on congressional power is that protection under the clause is
restricted to “authors and inventors.”27 Current copyright law has codified
this limitation by requiring “works of authorship.”28 As Professor Annemarie
Bridy notes, “who or what can be an author for purposes of the Copyright
Act is ultimately a constitutional question.”29 In considering whether a work
created by artificial intelligence can by copyrighted, the question then
becomes whether a constitutionally acceptable “author” exists at all.
It should be noted that this Comment is not concerned with weak
artificial intelligence, where humans control a predictable output.30 In such
a circumstance, the author would be the creative force who designed the
program code with a specific outcome in mind.31 The artificial intelligence
would be more akin to an artist’s paintbrush than the artist himself. There
is also no question that programmers have a strong copyright in the code
they write.32 Rather, the analysis here focuses on the outputs of a strong type
of artificial intelligence where the final product is emergent and difficult to
foresee.33
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constitutional limitations are: copyrights can be granted only 1) “to promote the progress of science
and useful arts”; 2) for “limited times”; 3) to “authors and inventors”; 4) to secure an “exclusive
right”; 5) for “writings and discoveries.” Id.
See id. (noting that “protection under the Clause is restricted to authors and inventors”); see also
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator
Please Stand Up?, 71 TULANE L. REV. 1675, 1700 (1997) (stating that the Constitution requires
copyrights be extended only to “authors”).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 398
(2016).
See Acosta, supra note 21 (differentiating weak artificial intelligence, which merely creates a program
tailored to the narrow function, from strong artificial intelligence, which entails randomness,
autonomy, and machine learning, so the human connection is much more attenuated).
For example, consider The Next Rembrandt, the artificial intelligence that digitized the painting
method of Rembrandt. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence,
Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New Model, 2017
MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 663–64 (2017). The algorithm there was designed with the explicit purpose
to create works of art in the style of Rembrandt. Thus, there is a human programmer controlling
the creative direction and output of the program who would probably qualify as the author.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding
that a computer program, whether in object code or source code, is protected by copyright law).
See Boyden, supra note 21, at 378–79 (defining “emergent works” as “works that consist largely of
creative elements that have emerged unbidden from the operation of the program” and cannot be
traced directly to a human source). But see James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a ComputerAuthored Work—And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 414–15 (2016) (arguing that
we should think of computer “authored” works as computer “generated” because current artificial
intelligence is not yet responsive to incentives or unpredictable enough, and that these computergenerated works are no different than other works).
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As of now, the Copyright Office has taken the position that works by
machines that operate randomly without any creative input from a human
author, such as a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces
irregular shapes in fabric without any discernable pattern, do not qualify as
a work of human authorship.34 However, as the popularity and value of
artificial intelligence continues to grow, Congress may want to protect these
works, and thus it is important to understand the constitutional limitations
placed on Congress in expanding copyright protection.
Using a step-by-step method of constitutional interpretation, this
Comment seeks to answer the question of whether the term “author” can be
properly understood to encompass the creators of the algorithm, the
algorithm itself, or whether there is no author, in which case it would be
constitutionally impermissible to grant copyright to machine authored
works.35 Employing Professor Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional
interpretation, Part I seeks to analyze the different constitutional arguments
Congress could make for extending copyright protection to works generated
by artificial intelligence. Part II then reconciles the modalities to draw a
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of extending copyright protection.
This Comment concludes that a proper reading of the Constitution suggests
that the programmer of the algorithm can be considered an “author,” and
thus Congress can extend copyright protection to works of artificial
intelligence, even though the programmer may not fit the conventional
definition of “author.”
I. ANALYSIS
Over the course of three evenings in April 1979, Professor Philip Bobbitt
shared with students and colleagues at the University of Texas School of Law
what would become a revolutionary approach to constitutional
interpretation. These lectures, recorded in a now famous law review
article,36 provided the groundwork for his later innovative works,

34
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See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed.
2017) (stating the Copyright Office “will not register works produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or
intervention from a human author”).
See Yu, supra note 22, at 1265–66 (considering the consequences of immediate entry into the public
domain because of lack of a legal author).
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1980).
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Constitutional Fate37 and Constitutional Interpretation,38 where he lays out six
modalities for understanding the meaning of the Constitution. Bobbitt’s
modalities have since become a dominant method to interpreting our
founding document and have been influential in law classrooms around the
country.39
As defined by Bobbitt, a modality is “the way . . . we characterize a form
of expression as true.”40 In a constitutional sense, we can use modalities to
characterize certain legal propositions as true.41 The six modalities that
Bobbitt lays out are as follows: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal,
prudential, and ethical,42 and “[t]here is no constitutional legal argument
outside these modalities.”43 By employing the modalities to interpret the text
of the IP Clause, and more specifically the term “author,” this Comment
concludes that Congress has strong arguments that the programmer of an
artificially intelligent algorithm can constitutionally be considered the
“author” for purposes of extending copyright protection to the algorithm’s
output, despite not fitting a conventional definition of author.
A. History
The first modality we use to interpret the meaning of the Constitution is
history. A historical argument “rel[ies] on the intentions of the [F]ramers
and [R]atifiers of the Constitution”44 and “on a determination of the original
understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed.”45 This may
seem like a fruitless exercise—the Framers and Ratifiers could not have
dreamed of a world where machines were creating their own works of art. If
this technology did not exist at the time the Constitution was created, then

37
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PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1703–04 (1994) (lauding
Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate as “one of a handful of truly towering works of constitutional theory in
the last half-century” and stating, “in every class I teach, and in everything I write, Bobbitt’s book
is in my mind, influencing and inspiring me”).
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12; see also, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–92 (1983) (tracing the long history of
chaplains in Congress to find that prayer in the Nebraska legislature did not violate the
Establishment clause); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 475 (1857) (relying on history
to argue African Americans are not considered citizens for purposes of Article III diversity
jurisdiction).
Bobbitt, supra note 36, at 700.
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how could the Framers’ intentions have any relevance? While the Framers
undoubtedly did not anticipate the technology we have today, their
understanding of the word “author” and their interpretation of the IP Clause
can provide insight into whether machine-authored works can qualify for
copyright.
A common method for determining the original meaning of the
Constitution is to look at dictionaries that existed during the Founding Era.46
This technique allows us to discover the meaning of the Constitution’s words
as they were commonly used and understood.47 Most of these period
dictionaries define “author” as some variant of, “[t]he first mover of any
thing . . . the efficient cause of any thing.”48 Other definitions have included
the phrase, “[t]he first beginner . . . of any thing”49 or, “[t]he prime or first
cause of a thing.”50 In Noah Webster’s dictionary, “author” was defined as
“one who produces, creates or brings into being; as, God is the author of the
Universe.”51 What all these definitions have in common is some sense of a
creator that brings something into being or is the cause. While some of these
definitions provide the example of a writer of a book as a common use of
“author,”52 the definition is in no way restricted to such interpretation.
Using this objective approach to the word “author,” it is conceivable that
the programmer is the author of the program’s outputs. Obvious’s Edmond
de Belamy portrait could not have been created without the code developed
by programmers, and so programmers can be understood to be the “first
mover” of the painting. Similarly, using the Copyright Office’s example of

46
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Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original
Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 365 (2014) (citing to Justice Scalia for
frequently using period dictionaries to determine the “original meaning” of the text).
Id. at 364–65.
See, e.g., Author, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1775), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=LDNAAAAAYAAJ; see also
Author, 1 NATHAN BAILEY, THE NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1756), available at http://books.google.com/books/?id=HXQSAAAAIAAJ.
See Author, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792)
[hereinafter Samuel Johnson Dictionary], available at http://books.google.com/books?id=jUIAAAAQAAJ. Professor Maggs has declared the Samuel Johnson Dictionary as “one of the most
authoritative eighteenth-century dictionaries.” Maggs, supra note 46, at 359; see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (relying on the Samuel Johnson Dictionary to interpret the word
“limited” in the IP Clause).
See Author, THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (18th
ed. 1781), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=xOcIAAAAQAAJ.
See Author, 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828),
available at https://archive.org/stream/americandictiona01websrich#page/n7/mode/2up.
Id.
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a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces irregular shapes,53 the
machine’s creator is also the “first mover.” As God created the universe, so
too does the programmer create the algorithm. Surely one can “create” or
“cause” or “begin” some work of art without knowing what the outcome will
look like. The programmer is the “prime” of the work of art because she is
the first in a chain of events that leads to the painting’s creation.
The definitional case for the program as the author is also plausible. In
many of the definitions, there is no use of a pronoun to limit the author to a
human individual. The common use of God as an author is an example of
how the word was used beyond the context of human individuals.54
Intuitively, it makes sense that Obvious’s algorithm and the weaving machine
produced or created their works of art, and according to these period
definitions, the act of creation need not be limited to humans.55 While
creativity is a limitation in today’s copyright laws,56 these period definitions
contain no mention of a creativity requirement or any kind of mental process,
which would limit the understanding of the algorithm as an author.
However, to get a full picture of the Framers’ intentions, we need to look
beyond basic definitions.57 The Federalist Papers were written in the fall of
1787 and spring of 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, urging ratification of the Constitution.58 This collection of eighty-five
essays gives modern scholars an invaluable look into the Constitution as
understood by the Framers, Ratifiers, and the public. As Professor Gregory
Maggs has noted, “academic writers and jurists have cited the Federalist
Papers as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution more than
any other historical source except the text of the Constitution itself.”59 Any

53
54
55

56

57
58
59

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 34.
See Oliar, supra note 26, at 85 (citing to the Journals of the Continental Congress for evidence that God
was commonly referred to as “the author of man”).
But see Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“[T]he
Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to
animals.”), aff’d on other grounds, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (denying copyright
protection to a work for being “devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity”); see also Bridy, supra
note 23, at 27–28 (concluding that a machine’s “creativity” is “something other than (but owing to)
the human creativity of its coder”).
See Maggs, supra note 46, at 364 (stating that dictionaries are usually only used as evidence of
“objective” meaning).
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United
States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007).
Id.; see also, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invoking the Federalist Papers
throughout the opinion as evidence of original intent).
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historical interpretation of the Constitution would be incomplete without an
examination of the Federalist Papers.
The only Federalist Paper which refers to the IP Clause is Federalist 43,
written by James Madison, which makes short work of the clause, declaring,
“[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.”60 However, Madison
does state that the “public good [of copyrights] coincides . . . with the claims
of individuals.”61 Thus, we can understand the public good of copyright law
as stemming from the individual creators. A programmer could fit into this
understanding, but an algorithm in this sense is not an individual that can
lay a claim to its creation.
Federalist 43 also makes clear that the American idea of copyright stems
from British common law.62 As stated by Lord Mansfield, the source of
common law for copyright is “that an author should reap the pecuniary
profits of his own ingenuity and labor.”63 This same emphasis on natural
rights as the foundation for copyright is also expressed in some colonial
statutes.64 In the colonial period, a committee including James Madison was
formed to consider the best way to protect and promote the useful arts.65 On
May 2, 1783 the committee concluded that “nothing is more properly a
man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of
literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius.”66
The algorithm does not produce works that are the labor of its mind, nor
does it need any kind of encouragement or incentive to create. The
algorithm does not have a natural right to anything. Thus, while the Ratifiers

60
61
62
63

64

65
66

THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001).
Id.
See id. (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law.”).
1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 3–14 & n.6 (1994) (citing Millar v. Taylor
(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252); see also Bridy, supra note 23, at 4 (finding that the Framers used
England’s Statute of Anne as a model, in which the notion of the author as originator merged with
Locke’s theory of possessive individualism).
For example, New Hampshire’s colonial copyright statute stated that “the legal security of the fruits
of [an ingenious person’s] study and industry . . . is one of the natural rights of all men, there being
no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labor of his mind.”
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 3, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 8 (1973), available at
https://www.copyright.gov/history/Copyright_Enactments_1783-1973.pdf.
PATRY, supra note 63, at 14–22.
Id. (citing 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (1783)). The committee’s
sentiments also seem to invoke Hegel’s personality theory, which regards “property as playing a
central role in defining every person’s distinct personality.” Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright
and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1050 (2019).
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could not even begin to comprehend the artificial intelligence revolution,
their understanding of “author” would likely not include an algorithm.
It is less clear whether the programmer can be considered the author in
a situation of strong artificial intelligence. A piece of strong artificial
intelligence, like a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces
irregular shapes, creates outputs that are unforeseen by the programmer.
There is no way for the programmer to know what his program will produce.
The programmer’s code is unquestionably the “fruit of his study” and is the
“profit of his ingenuity,” but as mentioned earlier, the copyright in his code
is not at issue here. The final output is not necessarily a “product of his
mind” as much as it is a product of the algorithm’s “mind.” It is a stretch to
say that the Framers’ understanding of “author” would include either the
programmer or algorithm. Thus, while Congress could argue for a broad
definitional interpretation of “author,” the historical understanding of the
term suggests that neither the programmer nor algorithm can
constitutionally be considered an author.
B. Text
The next modality of constitutional interpretation looks at the plain text
of the Constitution.67 A textual argument “look[s] to the meaning of the
words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average
contemporary ‘man on the street.’”68 This method is contained to the text
and does not consider anything outside the scope of the words of the
Constitution. Our understanding of the text can change over time, though.69
In this case, the plain text reads, “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”70 The crux of this analysis turns on the word
“author” because the Constitution does not permit copyright in any work of
art that comes into existence, but only those created by authors. However,
there is nothing in the Constitution that describes who or what an author is.

67
68
69

70

BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 12.
Id.
Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding that wiretapping does not fit
the definition of “search and seizure” since there is no physical taking of evidence or entry into the
home) with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that wiretapping does fit within
the meaning of “search and seizure” of the Fourth Amendment and that the electronic device did
not physically penetrate the wall of the telephone booth was of “no constitutional significance”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The most common understanding of an author is probably a human
individual who writes a book, but “author” can also plainly be understood to
mean “one that originates or creates something.”71
There is enough room here for Congress to argue that, strictly based on
the text of the Constitution, the programmer could be interpreted as the
“originator” of a piece of work created by his code. A broader reading of the
Constitution could also be made to include an algorithm as an author
because the algorithm could properly be understood by a person on the street
as “creating” the work of art. The text of the Constitution is broad enough
to support arguments for copyright protection.
This is not the end of our analysis, however, as a strong textual argument
will also look at the clause’s location within the text of the Constitution and
its relationship with the rest of the document. An example of this type of
“intratextual” argument can be seen in Chief Justice Marshall’s canonical72
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.73 The argument is clearly presented by
Professor Akhil Amar.74 In McCulloch, the state of Maryland claimed that the
Necessary and Proper Clause, “though in terms of a grant of power, is not so
in effect; but is really restrictive.”75 Looking to the text, Chief Justice
Marshall rejected this argument, reasoning that had the clause been designed
to restrict rather than grant power, its text would have been worded
differently.76 The Necessary and Proper Clause is located in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution—a part of the Constitution that grants
Congress power.77 If the clause was meant to be restrictive, it would have
been negatively written “in terms resembling these[:] . . . ‘no laws shall be
passed but such as are necessary and proper.’ Had the intention been to
make this clause restrictive, it would unquestionably have been so in
[grammatical and syntactical] form as well as in effect.”78

71

72
73
74
75
76
77
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See Author, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
author (defining “author” as “the writer of a literary work (such as a book)” or “one that originates
or creates something”).
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 22 (2012) (“[T]o read McCulloch
is to behold the art of constitutional interpretation at its acme”).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750–51 (1999).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412.
Id. at 420.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.”).
Amar, supra note 74, at 751 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420).
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Just like the Necessary and Proper Clause, the IP Clause is located in
Article I, Section 8 granting power to Congress. The IP Clause, properly
considered within the text of the Constitution, should be understood not as
a restriction of power but expansion of congressional authority. Following
Chief Justice Marshall’s logic in McCulloch, if the clause was meant to be
restrictive it would have been written negatively like this: “no rights shall be
secured except for those by authors to their respective writings.” The clause
is not written this way, however, and is located in a section of the Constitution
explicitly granting Congress power. Thus, while the “man on the street’s”
definition of “author” may be too ambiguous to be helpful, a strong textual
argument can be made that Congress does have the authority to extend
copyright protection to the work of a programmer or even an algorithm that
does not fit the conventional definition of “author.”
C. Structure
The structural modality of constitutional interpretation is less intuitive
than a historical or textual argument, but just as important. Tracing its
origins back to McCulloch v. Maryland,79 this modality relies on the
relationships created by the Constitution among the structures it sets up.80 A
structural argument first sets out an uncontroversial statement about a
constitutional structure, then infers a relationship from this structure,
followed by a factual assertion about the world, and finally a conclusion is
drawn.81
Here, the chain of logic is as follows: 1) the Constitution, through the IP
Clause, grants Congress the power to assign exclusive rights to authors to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts”; 2) we can then infer that
this power gives rise to congressional authority to structure copyright law in
a way that achieves this goal; 3) if works by artificial intelligence are not
eligible for copyright protection, this goal is not achieved; 4) therefore,
Congress can expand the meaning of “author” to include the programmer
or the program, thus extending copyright protection to works created by
artificial intelligence.
Step one is undisputed and step two flows naturally from step one. If
Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and the useful

79

80
81

See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 327–28 (making a structural argument that a state, whose
officials are elected by the state’s constituency, cannot tax the federal government and thus tax a
nationwide constituency).
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 12–13.
Id. at 16.
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arts, then it must be able to structure copyright law in a way that achieves
this. The Constitution does not describe how copyright law should look, nor
does it define “author,” but rather defers to Congress to iron out the details.
The potentially problematic assumption is step three. Because Congress has
the power to assign rights to promote the progress of science and useful arts
and has deference to structure copyright law in a way to achieve this goal, in
order to assign rights to machine-authored works in a constitutionally
permissible way, the use of copyright law must promote the progress of
science and useful arts.82
The best argument that artificial intelligence needs copyright protection
relies on an incentive theory. The idea is that copyright law is trying to
advance a social goal—the promotion of science and the useful arts—but
there is an inherent under-production problem, also known as a lighthouse
problem.83 This under-production is caused by non-rivalrous consumption
and non-excludability of benefits—non-rivalrous because the consumption
of intellectual property is not diminished by others and non-excludable
because even those who do not pay can enjoy the works. This country’s
solution to incentivize creation of intellectual property is not to give money
to authors but rather to give them legal exclusivity.
Here, the problem is that without protection, there would be no way for
programmers to control who uses their algorithms’ artistic creations. It
would be much more expensive for programmers to create works than for
copyists to reproduce, and thus there would be insufficient incentive to create
algorithms that produce useful works. The capability of artificial intelligence
will only continue to grow and is surely valuable in promoting science and
the useful arts. Because fewer useful algorithms, and therefore fewer works,
would be produced without legal protection, Congress is permitted to extend
copyright protection to works created by artificial intelligence, even if neither

82

83

See Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin.
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 130–31 (1983) (statement of Richard H. Stern)
(testifying that Congress only has the power to legislate copyright law in ways that will promote
science and the useful arts, not to “create private fortunes” without benefiting the public).
The Lighthouse is commonly used to illustrate the economic issues associated with non-exclusivity
and lack of rivalry. A lighthouse cannot provide its light to paying boats without also providing
light to non-paying boats. The consumption of the light by one boat does not diminish the amount
of light available to other boats. Thus, the revenue generated by the lighthouse will fall short of the
social value it creates, resulting in an under-production of lighthouses. See John Stuart Mill, Principles
of Political Economy, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 968 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965)
(describing the lighthouse example).
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the programmer nor the program fits under the conventional understanding
of an “author.”
The incentive theory is not without its critics. One criticism is that as
humans we do not need incentive to be creative. There is some inner drive
in humans that compels us to create, even if there is not legal protection for
our creations. For example, Obvious, the art collective that recently sold its
Edmond de Belamy painting for over $400,000, seems to have motivations that
are not purely monetary. Obvious strives to “explain and democratize
[advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning] through [their]
artworks.”84 When asked why they created an algorithm that produces
paintings, the Obvious coders responded, “we found that portraits provided
the best way to illustrate our point, which is that algorithms are able to
emulate creativity.”85 The intellectual curiosity that motivates coders to
create artificial intelligence in the first place may not need the legal protection
of copyright. Additionally, the artificial intelligence itself does not have any
motives or desires, and thus needs no incentive to create works.
Another criticism is that we do not want to make it difficult to access
works, and copyrights inherently make it more difficult for the public to
access the works. If copyrights were extended to artificial intelligence, there
would be an extra cost on society to access the works, which would run
against the “public good.”86 In a possible near future where artificial
intelligence becomes even more efficient at producing high-quality works of
art, it may be in the public’s best interest to have open access to these works.
Despite these criticisms, however, the incentive theory is still dominant in
the realm of copyright law.87 Notwithstanding a textual or historical
argument, Congress could make a plausible structural argument that it has
the power to extend copyright protection to machine authored works as long
as doing so promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, even if
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About Us, OBVIOUS ART, http://obvious-art.com/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
Jimmy Im, This Portrait Made by A.I. Just Sold for $432,000—That’s 40 Times the Original Estimate,
CNBC (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/25/portrait-made-byartificial-intelligence-sold-for-432k-at-christies.html.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001).
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the [IP Clause] is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, 3 LIFE
OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934) (1791) (“No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except
for money.”)).
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neither the programmer nor the program fit under an intuitive
understanding of “author.”
D. Doctrine
A doctrinal argument applies rules generated by precedent.88 This
modality looks at principles generated from caselaw that construes the
Constitution and interprets it accordingly.89 It should be noted, however,
that this modality’s “operation is not confined to the application of stare
decisis . . . . The Court is entitled, indeed obligated, to overrule itself when it
is persuaded that a particular precedent was wrongly decided and should not
be applied.”90 Thus, doctrine can guide us on how to interpret the
Constitution, but a particular court ruling is not the end of the analysis.
There has never been a case squarely addressing copyright in artificial
intelligence, but there have been a number of cases regarding who can be
considered an author.91 For the purposes of this Comment, the most direct
case is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.92 Set in the 1880s, the Court
tackled the controversy surrounding the cutting-edge technology of its day:
whether “congress had and has the constitutional right to protect
photographs and negatives thereof by copyright.”93 The petitioners made
the argument that a photograph is not the production of an author, and
therefore cannot qualify for copyright protection.94 Acknowledging the
constitutional nature of this question, Justice Miller went on to define an
“author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one
who completes a work of science or literature.”95
The Court ultimately found that the Constitution was “broad enough to
cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”96 While a
camera uses a mechanical process to create a photograph, the author is
ultimately the one who selects and arranges the photo shoot entirely from
88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95
96

BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (stating that
“author” presupposes a degree of originality, requiring independent creation and a minimal degree
of creativity).
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
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“his own original mental conception.”97 The Court suggested that it is the
artist’s “intellectual invention” that makes him the author and cited the
English case Nottage v. Jackson for support.98
If analyzed in a vacuum, this case seems to show that there is no author
in a work generated by artificial intelligence. The algorithm certainly does
not have a mental conception and in a truly emergent or unforeseen work,
such as the weaving machine that produces random designs, the patterns
cannot fairly be considered the programmer’s intellectual invention.
However, our conception of “author” does not exist in a vacuum but has
evolved over the years. One striking example is that employers were not
recognized as authors.99 The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first statute to
state that the employer was the “author” in the case of “works made for
hire.”100 In Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, the Second Circuit found that Walt
Disney and Irving Berlin were the authors of a song, even though it was
actually written by the plaintiff and one of Irving’s employees.101 The court
found that Disney and Berlin were the “motivating factors” in the
composition of the new song, and having taken the initiative to hire the
plaintiff, they had the power to “accept, reject, or modify her work.”102
Professor Peter Jaszi has found the effect of this decision was that the
Romantic conception of “authorship” was “disaggregated from the
associated component of intellectual and physical labor.”103
In the case of works authored by artificial intelligence, the algorithm or
machine can be viewed as an “employee” and the programmers as the
employers, and ultimately the authors. Even though the algorithm is
undertaking the actual labor of producing the works, it is the programmer
who takes the initiative to create and instruct the algorithm. Whatever the
algorithm creates, the programmers have the ultimate decision to accept,
reject, or modify the work. Authorship is no longer thought of in the strictly
individualistic sense from the nineteenth century and can instead be
97
98

99

100
101
102
103

Id. at 60.
Id.; see also Nottage v. Jackson [1883] 52 QB 760 at 769 (Eng.) (“In my opinion, ‘author’ involves
originating, making, producing, as the inventive or mastermind, the thing which is to be protected,
whether it be a drawing or a painting or a photograph.”).
See, e.g., Nottage, 52 QB at 767 (explaining that a person who employs someone to paint a picture of
a lady “with a dog at her feet, and in one hand holding a flower” is not the author just because he
has the idea).
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 487
(1991).
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id.
Jaszi, supra note 100, at 489.
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understood as the party who is the “inspiration” of the work, which in this
case belongs to the programmers. While Professor Bridy has noted that
works of artificial intelligence cannot be considered works made for hire
under current copyright law,104 this analogy shows that the Court’s
understanding of authorship is flexible and has changed over time.
Recent precedent also suggests that Congress has broad discretion in
expanding copyright law and courts will generally find congressional changes
in copyright law to be consistent with the Constitution. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the plaintiff challenged the 1998 Copyright Term Extensions Act, arguing
that it violated the “limited Times” restriction in the IP Clause.105
Specifically, the plaintiff’s argument was that extending copyright protection
to existing works meant the work is protected indefinitely, not for a limited
time.106 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument in
part by pointing to a number of instances where the courts deferred to
Congress’s decisions regarding copyright law.107 While acknowledging that
the IP Clause’s primary objective is to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts,” she wrote, “[w]e have also stressed, however, that it is generally
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause’s objectives.”108 The Court went on to hold that “[t]he Copyright
Clause . . . empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right.”109
While it may not be obvious or intuitive that a programmer or algorithm
is an “author” of the work generated by the artificial intelligence, the courts
will defer to Congress in deciding who qualifies as an author and thus the
scope of copyright protection. If Congress can show an enactment extending
copyright protection to works of artificial intelligence is “rational,” judges will
defer.110 If we interpret the Eldred decision as evidence of judicial deference
to congressional legislation of copyright law, then we should expect that a
court would find congressional expansion of copyrights to artificial
intelligence to be constitutionally sound.
The historical practice regarding copyright law mirrors both the
doctrinal development of a liberal interpretation of “author” and a deference
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Bridy, supra note 23, at 27.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 212–13, 215.
Id. at 218 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 208 (finding that the Act’s extension of protection is “rational” and holding that “we are
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order,
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
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to Congress. The reality is that copyright law has moved exclusively toward
more protection.111 Every new technology has been granted more
protection, not less. For example, the Statute of Anne, the first copyright act
in England, protected only printed books,112 but the American Copyright Act
of 1790 covered maps, charts, and books.113 Today copyright law protects
an open list of works, including: literary works; musical works; dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; and architectural works.114 While there may be constitutional
limits to extending copyright protection, Congress has consistently found the
best way to encourage progress is by expanding copyright protection.
E. Prudence
A prudential argument breaks from the previous modalities by
considering the practical effects of an outcome and “seeking to balance the
costs and benefits of a particular rule.”115 No constitutional decision exists in
a theoretical bubble, and the practical effects of a particular rule should be
analyzed. These costs and benefits depend on political or economic
realities.116 Professor Bobbitt makes clear that a prudential argument cannot
be the sole basis of a constitutional decision but can establish a predicate for
the action.117
Here, we must consider the pros and cons of providing copyright
protection to works of artificial intelligence. One of the main benefits of
providing copyright protection is the creation of more useful artificial
intelligence technology. The United States Government wants to incentivize
programmers to create more algorithms that produce beautiful and useful
works, and extending copyright law is a way to do this. If we buy into the
notion that there needs to be an incentive structure to create more artificial
intelligence, then this is a strong prudential argument for protecting
machine-authored works.
111
112
113
114
115
116
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This type of argument proved powerful in Eldred, where Justice Ginsburg relied on the history of
congressional practice of extending the terms of copyright. Id. at 200–01.
Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13.
Id. at 17; see also, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934) (finding that
the Minnesota state government properly exercised “the reserved power of the State to protect the
vital interests of the community” in responding to an emergency).
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 16.
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Another benefit of protecting artificial intelligence works is simply the
availability of more works to the public. Copyright law does not get into the
business of evaluating the quality of a work of art,118 but the production of
more works of art is good for society. With artificial intelligence, society will
have more books, faster news reports, and more paintings. Without a legal
structure that incentivizes the creation of artificial intelligence, society would
miss out on these potential benefits.
There are also costs associated with extending copyright protection,
however. For one, there is the issue of copyright ownership. A complicated
piece of code requires many different programmers and often involves open
source code. Can a programmer who was involved with just a section of the
code really lay legal claim to a painting produced by the completed
algorithm? For example, Obvious was criticized for using a piece of code
created by a teenager on GitHub, an open source software development
platform, in creating its Edmond de Belamy painting.119 Should the teenager
receive a copyright for the output of Obvious’s algorithm? The issue of
copyright ownership may also require Congress to delve into the existential
question of whether the artificial intelligence can qualify for legal
personhood.120 This Comment does not probe the issue of ownership, but it
must be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of extending
copyright protection.
Another important issue is the cost to the public of a world with more
copyrights. Copyright law acts as an incentive for authors to produce more
works but can lead to supracompetitive pricing as a result of a legal monopoly
on the work. In a possibly not-so-distant future where artificial intelligence
is producing a large amount of the art and literature we consume, the
copyright owners can charge a high price for their algorithms’ outputs.
Especially in a scenario where just a few corporations dominate the field of
artificial intelligence,121 a legal monopoly over the output of the artificial
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119
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See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
Tom Simonite, How a Teenager’s Code Spawned a $432,500 Piece of Art, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/teenagers-code-spawned-dollar-432500-piece-of-art/.
See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (asking
whether an artificial intelligence can become a legal person).
See Tiernan Ray, Google Has the All-Important AI Edge Over Microsoft, THESTREET (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/google-ai-edge-over-microsoft-14821147 (describing
the dominance of Google and Microsoft in the market of machine learning).
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intelligence could mean a shift of costs to the public and less public access to
these works.
Congress should also be aware of the distributional effects of replacing
human authors with artificially intelligent ones. As artificial intelligence
grows in efficiency, human artists that cannot compete will be displaced. Of
course, many jobs are already in danger of “computerisation,” and
occupations requiring creativity, like authors or fine artists, are not currently
at high risk of displacement.122 Extending copyright protection to works of
artificial intelligence, however, would likely exacerbate displacement by
allowing creators of the algorithms to monetize their programs’ outputs.
This may also favor large corporations who have the resources to create
innovative algorithms at the expense of individual artists.
In addition to the increased administrative and litigation costs that come
with expanding copyright law, extending copyright protection could lead to
a chilling effect on future creativity. We are currently living in a “remix age”
where creativity depends on existing works. By providing copyright to the
works of artificial intelligence, Congress may be giving too much protection
to the original creators and stifling the creativity of those who are inspired to
create derivative works. Thus, as artificial intelligence is able to create more
works faster, the costs imposed on society by an expansive copyright scheme
may outweigh the benefits to the owners of the copyrighted works. As noted
earlier, however, incentive theory drives much of the policy behind copyright
law, and thus Congress still has a powerful prudential argument to extend
copyright protection.
F. Ethos
An ethical argument “deriv[es] rules from those moral commitments of
the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.”123 The idea is
that the American people have a distinct national identity with certain
traditions and beliefs that are embedded in the Constitution.124 Professor
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Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to
Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 270–71 (ranking “fine artists,
including painters, sculptors, and illustrators” and “writers and authors” as at a relatively low risk
of “computerisation,” around the same as lawyers).
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13.
BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45129, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 20 (2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45129.pdf; see also, e.g.,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking
down an Ohio zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single
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Bobbitt found this type of argument covered the “patch[es] of uncolored
text,” where a judicial opinion “contains expressions of considerable passions
and conviction” not seen in the other modalities.125 It is important to note,
however, that this modality is not a moral argument generally.126 Thus, we
are not concerned with moral implications for considering a programmer or
program as the author, but rather the American tradition and moral
commitments reflected in the Constitution.
Limited government is a fundamental American constitutional ethos, and
here, the Constitution limits congressional power to extend copyright
protection only to works of authors.127 This limitation and others, such as
“for limited times” and “to promote science and useful arts,” are important
in recognizing the American ethos of limited government. The Framers were
simultaneously providing Congress powers but also limiting its authority to
prevent any potential for abuse. One example of copyright abuse is the
creation of monopolies. Copyright law effectively grants a legal monopoly
to the holder of the copyright. The Framers were fundamentally opposed to
monopolies,128 and while James Madison’s arguments for the necessity of the
IP Clause ultimately won, he also wrote that monopolies must be “guarded
with strictness agst [sic] abuse.”129 In a potential future where many works
are generated by artificial intelligence, extending copyright protection could
give the corporations that create the algorithms a huge control over the
public. Congress should not be able to blur the boundaries of the IP Clause
to interpret “author” in such a way that would harm the public by giving
monopolistic power to corporations in the business of artificial intelligence.
Next to limited government in the pantheon of American values is free
speech but extending copyright protection to works created by artificial
intelligence could also negatively impact the public’s freedom of speech. As
Professor Dotan Oliar argues, “[c]opyright law hampers free speech because
it prevents people from writing, copying, publishing, disseminating, or
performing forms of speech that would have been otherwise permissible.”130
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127
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129
130

family because “the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
and is “deserving of constitutional recognition”).
Bobbitt, supra note 36, at 727.
BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 21.
Id.
See Oliar, supra note 26, at 65 (writing that Jefferson thought it would be better to prohibit all
monopolies than to allow an exception for intellectual property rights).
James Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments., in Elizabeth Fleet,
Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 551 (1946).
Oliar, supra note 26, at 65.
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Considering the program or programmer as the author would extend
copyright protection to machine-authored works and thus expand the
reaches of copyright law. Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of the
American national identity and would caution against any expansion of
copyright law that infringes on it.
While these are strong arguments against the expansion of governmental
power, the Constitution was also heavily influenced by the Enlightenment.131
This American ethos of progress and promotion of human ingenuity is
powerful.132 The United States became a world leader in science and
engineering by investing heavily in research and development, producing the
most advanced degrees in science and engineering, and publishing highimpact scientific publications.133 Americans believe that the Federal
Government should continue to provide funds for scientific research to
ensure America remains competitive globally.134 If a broad interpretation of
“author” promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, then Congress
would be in line with American ethos in expanding copyright law.
II. RECONCILING THE MODALITIES
So, is it constitutionally permissible to consider the programmer or the
algorithm as an “author,” and is Congress therefore able to extend copyright
protection to works created by artificial intelligence? We have considered
the question from six different constitutional perspectives, but we still need
to reconcile each perspective’s outcome. A historical argument shows that
objectively, the programmer or algorithm could fit under a period
dictionary’s definition of “author,” but probably not under the Framers’
understanding of an “author.” Under the textual modality, a contemporary
“man on the street” would have a more liberal understanding of “author”
and we see that the location of the IP Clause in the Constitution and the
sentence structure grants a broad discretionary power to Congress.
Structurally, the IP Clause grants Congress authority as long as the extension
of copyright protection to works of artificial intelligence would promote
“science and useful arts.” Turning to the doctrine, works generated by
131
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See generally Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1992) (arguing that the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment had a
significant influence on the development of the American Constitution).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (stating that the “utility”
of a power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . will scarcely be questioned”).
U.S. Science and Technology Leadership Increasingly Challenged by Advances in Asia, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Jan.
19, 2016), https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=137394.
Id.
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artificial intelligence may not have an author under a strict reading of BurrowGiles, but by deferring to Congress, an acceptable scheme of copyright
protection could be argued by analogizing to Picture Music, Inc. and the “work
made for hire” doctrine. Eldred and a consistent historical practice towards
expanding copyright protection also support a broad interpretation of the IP
Clause. Prudentially, copyright law may be the best way to encourage the
production of more artificial intelligence, but it would be difficult to construct
an acceptable legal framework for assigning rights and society may bear the
costs of more copyrights. From an ethical perspective, the Constitution
stands for limiting the power of government and protecting free speech, but
also celebrates scientific progress.
There is no hierarchy among these modalities and to rank them would
delegitimize the procedure of constitutional interpretation.135 Indeed,
constitutional interpretation is not simply a mathematical equation where
one plugs in the modalities and receives the correct outcome—even within
the modalities there are conflicting arguments.136 What this constitutional
analysis provides us, then, is not a single correct answer to the problem, but
rather a sound process to explore the strong constitutional arguments on both
sides.
Of course, the decision of whether it is constitutional to extend copyright
to works of artificial intelligence will ultimately come down to a judge’s
individual decision, guided by his or her sensibilities.137 This does not mean,
however, that we cannot use the modalities to accurately interpret the IP
Clause. By viewing each modality not as an end but as a means towards a
holistic understanding of the Constitution, we can conclude that it would be
constitutionally permissible for Congress to pass a law extending copyright
protection to works of artificial intelligence by considering the programmer
as the author, even if the programmer does not fit the conventional
definition.
This Comment’s analysis demonstrates that the algorithm itself cannot
be considered an “author” under the Constitution. Intratextualism,
constitutional structure, and historical practice show that Congress is given a
wide degree of discretion in extending copyright, but for the clause to have
any meaning, there must be some limits. The original understanding of
“author” and the purpose behind the IP Clause suggest an algorithm that
possesses no creative thought and no personhood to lay claim to its outputs
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is not an author. While our understanding of the term is broad, it would be
a stretch even today to find that an algorithm fits the definition of “author,”
and is more akin to an artist’s paintbrush than the artist herself. The
algorithm needs no incentive to produce, which undermines the structural
and prudential arguments, and while we may no longer have a romantic
conception of “authorship,” there still appears to be a requirement of
“inspiration” or “creativity” in copyright law doctrine.
At the same time, a world where works of artificial intelligence receive no
copyright protection is undesirable. If we accept the premise that there is an
inherent under-production problem for works of artificial intelligence, then
without copyright we would have many fewer works and algorithms capable
of creating these works. Works of artificial intelligence have proven to be
useful, valuable, and promising for future developments in artificial
intelligence. Intuitively, something so important to the future of American
innovation should be protected.
If Congress wants to find a way to extend copyright protection to works
of strong artificial intelligence, it would be constitutionally permissible do so
by considering the programmers as the authors. The programmer is a
human individual with creativity, satisfying an originalist and contemporary
understanding of “author.” While the programmer may not know exactly
what the algorithm will produce, by analogizing to the work-for-hire
doctrine, we can view the programmer as the “inspiration” for the work and
the algorithm as the employee. In light of the textual and structural power
given to Congress, and the American ethos and prudence to encourage
scientific innovation, a judge would likely follow the Eldred reasoning and
defer to a congressional act extending copyright protection to artificial
intelligence.
CONCLUSION
In a world where works like Obvious Art’s Edmond de Belamy become more
pervasive and valuable, Congress may rethink the Copyright Office’s stance
that works of strong artificial intelligence are not works of authorship.
Congress may want to expand the reach of copyright protection to works
created by artificial intelligence by amending the Copyright Act, and if it
does, it is crucial to understand the constitutional limitations it would face.
Employing Professor Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional interpretation,
this analysis considers the Constitution holistically and allows us to properly
understand the IP Clause. By looking to the Constitution, this Comment
concludes that Congress can constitutionally consider the programmer as the
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“author,” and therefore an act expanding copyright protection to works of
artificial intelligence would be constitutionally sound.

